Feeling Good Versus Doing Good: Reclaiming a Moral Vision for the Psychology of Gratitude

Positive psychology scholarship has been criticized for prioritizing individuals’ personal well-being over moral concerns. Therefore, using the example of gratitude, we offer a corrective to this imbalance by articulating a moral vision for the psychology of gratitude. Specifically, we propose the contextualist morality model of gratitude to integrate philosophical, conceptual, and empirical insights on the interface of morality and gratitude. Within this model, we offer a contextualist view by situating gratitude within a constellation of other related virtues. We explicate the moral bases, moral sensitivity, and moral functions of gratitude. First, we identify three moral virtues that facilitate the development of gratitude—humility, empathy, and altruism. Second, we address how moral concerns shape people’s experience of gratitude and their judgments of the appropriateness of gratitude. That is, the extent to which people feel grateful to others and believe it is appropriate to be grateful is informed by moral concerns, such as perceptions of the benefactor’s morality.

Third, we articulate the moral consequences of experiencing and expressing gratitude. Building on McCullough et al.’s (2001) moral affect theory, which posits that gratitude is a moral barometer, motivator, and reinforcer, we propose that gratitude also functions as a moral cultivator of other prosocial virtues (e.g., forgiveness), a moral regulator (restraining immoral and uncivil behaviors), and a moral blessing (conferring goodness via a sense of mattering on gratitude recipients). We conclude with suggestions for future research and practice based on the contextualist morality model.