<p>This paper proposes a reinterpretation of cognitive biases as adaptive tools in organizational decision-making and challenges the traditional view that identifies them as mere obstacles to rationality. By integrating bounded rationality theory and virtue epistemology, it argues that biases can function as strategic heuristics in contexts characterized by uncertainty, incomplete information, and time constraints. These virtuous deviations acquire teleological value when aligned with specific organizational goals, provided they are institutionalized through reflective structures (feedback cycles, cognitive diversity, and meta-routines) that mitigate their potential risk. The theoretical framework, termed bounded virtue, assumes that the effectiveness of biases depends on their ability to generate non-random true beliefs (aptness) in specific epistemic niches, combining individual competencies and collective systems. To assess these dynamics, the BV Score is introduced, a metric that weighs heuristic successes, contextual learning, and the dynamic impact of errors, integrating qualitative and quantitative dimensions.</p>