<p>Business ethics scholars have argued that the way business is conceived and theorized can drive out our ability to think ethics. This article examines that problem by drawing attention to inherent normativity in metaphors we use to imagine organizations. We use Levinas-scholarship to characterize ethics as radically other-oriented and undertake close reading of his major work to articulate problematic aspects of images for organizational metaphors. This leads us to distinguish two types of metaphors: (1) images of organization with a Totalizing normativity which reduce all otherness and in that sense are normatively self-referential; and (2) images with a normativity that distorts the image, in which the organization is not the normative reference point. The article provides examples of both types of metaphors and argues that the first type of metaphors maintains a cognitive trap, whereas the second type can trigger moral imagination, i.e. give us operative mental models that allow us to perceive a situation from the perspective of others.</p>

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Inherent Normativity of Metaphors: Ethics, Organizations, and Moral Imagination

  • Wim Vandekerckhove,
  • Myrtle Emmanuel

摘要

Business ethics scholars have argued that the way business is conceived and theorized can drive out our ability to think ethics. This article examines that problem by drawing attention to inherent normativity in metaphors we use to imagine organizations. We use Levinas-scholarship to characterize ethics as radically other-oriented and undertake close reading of his major work to articulate problematic aspects of images for organizational metaphors. This leads us to distinguish two types of metaphors: (1) images of organization with a Totalizing normativity which reduce all otherness and in that sense are normatively self-referential; and (2) images with a normativity that distorts the image, in which the organization is not the normative reference point. The article provides examples of both types of metaphors and argues that the first type of metaphors maintains a cognitive trap, whereas the second type can trigger moral imagination, i.e. give us operative mental models that allow us to perceive a situation from the perspective of others.