<p>We conducted an experimental investigation to examine whether detailed information feedback improves coordination in a minimum-effort game with continuous-time cheap talk. Continuous-time cheap talk allows participants to revise messages freely while continuously observing the messages of other group members. We implemented two treatments: Full Feedback and Limited Feedback. In the Full Feedback treatment, participants were informed of the distribution of effort levels in their group, whereas in the Limited Feedback treatment, they were informed only of the minimum effort level. Our main findings are threefold. First, there were no significant differences in either average effort or minimum effort between the two treatments. Second, effort adjustment exhibited an asymmetric pattern: participants who had chosen the highest effort in the previous round tended to reduce it, whereas those who had chosen the lowest effort tended to increase it. However, we find no robust evidence that Full Feedback systematically altered this pattern of individual adjustment. Third, participants in the Full Feedback treatment tended to revise their messages more frequently, especially in the later rounds. Taken together, these findings suggest that, in a continuous-time cheap-talk environment, detailed feedback may affect the coordination process more than the final effort outcome.</p>