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<p>The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the structure of the fundamental model of institutional evolution within J. R. Commons's institutional economics theory, which has hitherto remained obscure. Commons's theory has frequently been regarded as an applied theory within the domain of "labour economics", and its theoretical contributions have not been subject to favorable evaluation. However, since the 2000s, amid a reappraisal of Commons's theory in Europe and Japan, numerous new theoretical studies have been developed, yielding significant results. The extant literature reveals that Commons's institutional economics theory is not only characterized by features that are entirely distinct from those of mainstream economics but also highlights theoretical features that are critically lacking in mainstream economics. This paper, drawing particularly on the work of Gislain and Théret (L'économie institutionnelle: sa place dans l'économie politique 57–373, 2024b), attempts to methodologically model the "formula of transaction", a crucial theoretical framework within the institutional economics theory of Commons. Commons' formula of transaction elucidates that economic actions within economic societies are mutual actions, and that these mutual actions occur across three dimensions. These three transactions manifest respectively as economic phenomena, political phenomena, and ethical phenomena. The theory was developed to illustrate these three dimensions within society according to the dynamics of cumulative causal relations. Nonetheless, while preceding studies on this theory have effectively delineated its overarching framework, they have scarcely addressed the principles that govern these transactions. The present thesis incorporates the five principles emphasised by Commons into the structure of the three transactions. The mechanism by which these principles, functioning as either limiting or complementary factors, bring about the emergence of reasonable value – in the form of new institutions – within these transactions is identified.</p>

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Basic model of evolutionary institutional economics on J. R. Common’s institutional economics: a study of socio-economic evolution based on his "five principles"

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月23日

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  • Takayuki Nakahara

摘要

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the structure of the fundamental model of institutional evolution within J. R. Commons's institutional economics theory, which has hitherto remained obscure. Commons's theory has frequently been regarded as an applied theory within the domain of "labour economics", and its theoretical contributions have not been subject to favorable evaluation. However, since the 2000s, amid a reappraisal of Commons's theory in Europe and Japan, numerous new theoretical studies have been developed, yielding significant results. The extant literature reveals that Commons's institutional economics theory is not only characterized by features that are entirely distinct from those of mainstream economics but also highlights theoretical features that are critically lacking in mainstream economics. This paper, drawing particularly on the work of Gislain and Théret (L'économie institutionnelle: sa place dans l'économie politique 57–373, 2024b), attempts to methodologically model the "formula of transaction", a crucial theoretical framework within the institutional economics theory of Commons. Commons' formula of transaction elucidates that economic actions within economic societies are mutual actions, and that these mutual actions occur across three dimensions. These three transactions manifest respectively as economic phenomena, political phenomena, and ethical phenomena. The theory was developed to illustrate these three dimensions within society according to the dynamics of cumulative causal relations. Nonetheless, while preceding studies on this theory have effectively delineated its overarching framework, they have scarcely addressed the principles that govern these transactions. The present thesis incorporates the five principles emphasised by Commons into the structure of the three transactions. The mechanism by which these principles, functioning as either limiting or complementary factors, bring about the emergence of reasonable value – in the form of new institutions – within these transactions is identified.