<p>This paper explores the substantial and general requirements for reasonable value, a core concept in J. R. Commons’s institutional economics, that remains under-investigated compared to its procedural aspects. The author compares Commons’s approach with Sen’s concepts of realization-focused comparison, the capability approach, and agency. This study makes the following claims. Commons viewed reasonable value not as “perfect justice” but as a functional social order shaped by “the common-law method” to resolve conflicts and provide security of expectations. The substantive requirements for such an order include attainability, timeliness, and the proper allocation of rights, duties, liberties, and exposures. Commons’s theory can be understood as a development of Sen’s capability approach that more fully reflects the inherent sociality of human existence. While Sen views individuals as “committing subjects”, Commons shifts the analytical gaze toward the going concern as the “committed object”, evaluating whether collective organizations possess the requisite capabilities in light of public purpose. The pursuit of reasonable value is presented as an ongoing inquiry into institutional schemes that ensure a functional and equitable distribution of benefits and burdens. By integrating the technical logic of “physical opportunity” with the social logic of “proprietary opportunity”, the paper concludes that reasonable value serves as a macro-evaluative framework for ensuring that institutional capabilities remain sustainable and justifiable for all stakeholders in an evolving society.</p>