Scholarlink

<p>This article examines Colombia’s response to Venezuelan displacement between 2017 and 2021, focusing on the use of decree-based and administrative instruments to regularize nearly two million displaced Venezuelans and prevent statelessness. Drawing on a qualitative case study combining document analysis and thirty semi-structured interviews, the article analyses three key measures: the <i>Permiso Especial de Permanencia</i> (PEP), <i>Primero la Niñez</i>, and the <i>Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos</i> (ETPV). This article asks: how are executive policy instruments used to govern large-scale displacement in democratic settings, and what implications do they have for migration outcomes? Building on recent scholarship on <i>autocratic policy tools</i> (Natter and Slingenberg Natter K, Slingenberg L (2025) Who rules over migrants? Autocratic tools in migration policies (forthcoming (this special issue))), the article conceptualizes executive instruments as mechanisms that can concentrate decision-making authority within the executive. It shows that these tools enabled rapid and adaptive responses under conditions of urgency and political constraint, while also limiting political contestation and legislative involvement. At the same time, they produced forms of legal inclusion that remain temporary, discretionary, and vulnerable to policy change. The findings reveal a central tension: instruments that concentrate executive authority can expand migrant rights while undermining their durability. More broadly, the article challenges assumptions that executive-driven tools are inherently restrictive, highlighting instead their procedural logic and ambivalent role within democratic migration governance. By analytically distinguishing between policy tools and policy outcomes, the article contributes to debates on migration governance and executive power.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Autocratic Policy Tools and Permissive Outcomes: Governing Venezuelan Displacement in Colombia

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月20日

查看全文
  • María Gabriela Trompetero-Vicent,
  • Nelson Camilo Forero Medina

摘要

This article examines Colombia’s response to Venezuelan displacement between 2017 and 2021, focusing on the use of decree-based and administrative instruments to regularize nearly two million displaced Venezuelans and prevent statelessness. Drawing on a qualitative case study combining document analysis and thirty semi-structured interviews, the article analyses three key measures: the Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP), Primero la Niñez, and the Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos (ETPV). This article asks: how are executive policy instruments used to govern large-scale displacement in democratic settings, and what implications do they have for migration outcomes? Building on recent scholarship on autocratic policy tools (Natter and Slingenberg Natter K, Slingenberg L (2025) Who rules over migrants? Autocratic tools in migration policies (forthcoming (this special issue))), the article conceptualizes executive instruments as mechanisms that can concentrate decision-making authority within the executive. It shows that these tools enabled rapid and adaptive responses under conditions of urgency and political constraint, while also limiting political contestation and legislative involvement. At the same time, they produced forms of legal inclusion that remain temporary, discretionary, and vulnerable to policy change. The findings reveal a central tension: instruments that concentrate executive authority can expand migrant rights while undermining their durability. More broadly, the article challenges assumptions that executive-driven tools are inherently restrictive, highlighting instead their procedural logic and ambivalent role within democratic migration governance. By analytically distinguishing between policy tools and policy outcomes, the article contributes to debates on migration governance and executive power.