<p>By rejecting mentalism in explaining behavior, B. F. Skinner assumed the burden of interpreting complex psychological phenomena in behavioristic terms. In his attempt to explain phenomena such as creativity, problem-solving, and self-control, he used the terms <i>precurrent</i> or <i>preliminary behaviors</i> during certain periods of his writing. Nevertheless, he did not provide an explicit definition for these. This study aimed to provide an operational analysis of Skinner’s thinking on these terms by examining the contexts in which they appeared in his writings. This revealed that most uses of these terms were in his writing from 1953 to 1969, a period in which he was increasingly concerned with behavioristic interpretations of complex human behavior. He used the terms in the analysis of a wide range of phenomena but appeared to consider them particularly important to explaining phenomena traditionally described as mental or cognitive in nature. We suggest a definition of precurrent behavior and consider the implications of this to conceptual issues (e.g., behavior-behavior relations, molar versus molecular views of behavior, and relations between public/overt and private/covert behaviors), as well as practical issues related to teaching precurrent behaviors to facilitate learner performances traditionally considered to be cognitive in nature.</p>

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Precurrent Behavior in B. F. Skinner’s Writings: A Contextual Analysis

  • Thais Belo da Fonseca,
  • Matthew Lewon,
  • Carolina Laurenti

摘要

By rejecting mentalism in explaining behavior, B. F. Skinner assumed the burden of interpreting complex psychological phenomena in behavioristic terms. In his attempt to explain phenomena such as creativity, problem-solving, and self-control, he used the terms precurrent or preliminary behaviors during certain periods of his writing. Nevertheless, he did not provide an explicit definition for these. This study aimed to provide an operational analysis of Skinner’s thinking on these terms by examining the contexts in which they appeared in his writings. This revealed that most uses of these terms were in his writing from 1953 to 1969, a period in which he was increasingly concerned with behavioristic interpretations of complex human behavior. He used the terms in the analysis of a wide range of phenomena but appeared to consider them particularly important to explaining phenomena traditionally described as mental or cognitive in nature. We suggest a definition of precurrent behavior and consider the implications of this to conceptual issues (e.g., behavior-behavior relations, molar versus molecular views of behavior, and relations between public/overt and private/covert behaviors), as well as practical issues related to teaching precurrent behaviors to facilitate learner performances traditionally considered to be cognitive in nature.