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<p>Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. In recent years, Quayshawn Spencer has offered one of the most elaborate versions of that view, but his theory faces several problems (Spencer in Philos Stud 159:181–204, 2012; Spencer in J Philos 111:1–23, 2014; Spencer in 52:46–55, 2015; Spencer in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019a; Hochman in J Philos 110:331–351, 2013; Glasgow et al. in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Jackson in Philos Theory Pract Biol 14, 2022. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630">https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630</a>; Winsberg in Biol Philos 37:46, 2022; Msimang in Philos Pap 51:115–145, 2022; Kalewold in Metaphysics of race, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2024; Berenstain forthcoming). In this paper, I raise another problem for Spencer’s BRR, arguing that his theory does not fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. Spencer’s BRR involves significant epistemic and ethical risks, and these risks indirectly impact Spencer’s metaphysical conclusions. I rely on the “science and values” literature to show this and engage with STS and anthropology literature (Douglas in Inductive risk and values in science, 2000. <a href="http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c">http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c</a>; Douglas in Science, policy, and the value-free ideal, Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, 2009; Brown in Philos Sci 80:829–839, 2013; Brown in Current controversies in values and science, Routledge, Milton Park, 2017; Biddle and Kukla Explor Induc Risk Case Stud Values Sci 1:215–238, 2017; Elliot and Richards in Exploring inductive risk: case studies of values in science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017). This analysis raises broader questions about the relationship between values, social responsibility, and metaphysics. Previous criticisms of Spencer’s BRR have barely touched on those questions. Hence, by critically discussing problems with Spencer’s already troubled view, my main goal is to open the debate for such important questions.</p>

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The risk of biological race

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月30日

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  • Celso Neto

摘要

Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. In recent years, Quayshawn Spencer has offered one of the most elaborate versions of that view, but his theory faces several problems (Spencer in Philos Stud 159:181–204, 2012; Spencer in J Philos 111:1–23, 2014; Spencer in 52:46–55, 2015; Spencer in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019a; Hochman in J Philos 110:331–351, 2013; Glasgow et al. in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Jackson in Philos Theory Pract Biol 14, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630; Winsberg in Biol Philos 37:46, 2022; Msimang in Philos Pap 51:115–145, 2022; Kalewold in Metaphysics of race, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2024; Berenstain forthcoming). In this paper, I raise another problem for Spencer’s BRR, arguing that his theory does not fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. Spencer’s BRR involves significant epistemic and ethical risks, and these risks indirectly impact Spencer’s metaphysical conclusions. I rely on the “science and values” literature to show this and engage with STS and anthropology literature (Douglas in Inductive risk and values in science, 2000. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c; Douglas in Science, policy, and the value-free ideal, Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, 2009; Brown in Philos Sci 80:829–839, 2013; Brown in Current controversies in values and science, Routledge, Milton Park, 2017; Biddle and Kukla Explor Induc Risk Case Stud Values Sci 1:215–238, 2017; Elliot and Richards in Exploring inductive risk: case studies of values in science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017). This analysis raises broader questions about the relationship between values, social responsibility, and metaphysics. Previous criticisms of Spencer’s BRR have barely touched on those questions. Hence, by critically discussing problems with Spencer’s already troubled view, my main goal is to open the debate for such important questions.