In Verbal Behavior, Skinner (1957) defined verbal behavior as “behavior reinforced through the mediation of other persons” (p. 2) in which the delivery of reinforcement has been “conditioned precisely in order to reinforce the behavior of the speaker” (p. 225). By contrast, as part of relational frame theory (RFT), S. C. Hayes and colleagues instead defined verbal behavior as “the action of framing events relationally” (Hayes, Fox, et al., 2001, p. 43). The central task of this article is to clarify and resolve or dismiss this definitional dispute. Specifically, I investigate the nature of this dispute by determining what kind of definition each offers. As a result, I conclude that Skinner’s serves as a lexical definition—an assertion about the customary usage of the term verbal behavior (and its cognates). On the other hand, RFT’s qualifies as a type of persuasive definition; namely, a hybrid possessing some features of both stipulative and lexical definitions. As such, I argue that the two definitions serve different goals and are, therefore, not in conflict. Given that juxtaposing these two disparate definitions constitutes an “apples and oranges” comparison, I conclude that this faux dispute requires no resolution. Instead, I propose its dismissal. Lastly, RFT’s proponents raised three principal objections to Skinner’s definition. The fact that the two definitions are not in conflict does not absolve Skinner’s definitions of these objections. Therefore, after reviewing these three arguments, I offer counterarguments and conclude that Skinner’s definition survives largely unscathed.
