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<p>Waiting lists are used to allocate scarce resources when demand exceeds supply and pricing mechanisms are insufficient or inappropriate. We examine the interplay of strategic behavior of agents in waiting lists and supply-side interventions, such as improvements in resource quality and arrival rates. Using a dynamic assignment model and fixing the service discipline to First Come, First Served (FCFS), we show that such interventions can unintentionally increase waste and waiting time by making agents more selective. These are the first known formal analytical results on the effect of supply shocks on overall system performance in the presence of agent choice.</p>

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Agent selectiveness and supply-side interventions in waiting lists: performance and comparative statics

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月23日

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  • David Cantala,
  • René Leal-Vizcaíno,
  • Edwin Muñoz-Rodríguez

摘要

Waiting lists are used to allocate scarce resources when demand exceeds supply and pricing mechanisms are insufficient or inappropriate. We examine the interplay of strategic behavior of agents in waiting lists and supply-side interventions, such as improvements in resource quality and arrival rates. Using a dynamic assignment model and fixing the service discipline to First Come, First Served (FCFS), we show that such interventions can unintentionally increase waste and waiting time by making agents more selective. These are the first known formal analytical results on the effect of supply shocks on overall system performance in the presence of agent choice.