<p>This article studies the fulfillment of criminal intent in AI-assisted copyright crimes in Finland. As technologies continue to develop, new forms of acts fall under the already broad criminal law protection of copyright and challenge traditional doctrines of targeting of criminal liability. Regarding generative AI, the producer of the end product is the AI, which combines information from different sources rather than the person who programmes the AI with the task to produce certain type of output. Concerning criminal intent, this constellation is not without difficulties. Legal doctrine requires that criminal intent covers all elements of an illegal act. However, the involvement of AI causes uncertainties in the assessment of criminal intent, especially regarding the cognitive aspect, which can be illustrated with the help of a case example. In addition to interpreting the fulfillment of criminal intent, this article reflects on the outcome of the analysis of the principle of <i>ultima ratio</i> and assesses the expediency of the system, from both criminal law and copyright law perspectives in the described situations. This article shows that the current interpretation of the doctrine of criminal intent in the AI context favors famous works. We reach the conclusion that it is not justified to use criminal measures to solve problems created by developing technologies and then utilizing them. The rightholder’s legal position should be secured some other way.</p>

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Artificial Intelligence, Criminal Infringement and Intent – Is the Protection Really Equal for All Works?

  • Laura Tammenlehto,
  • Heikki Kallio

摘要

This article studies the fulfillment of criminal intent in AI-assisted copyright crimes in Finland. As technologies continue to develop, new forms of acts fall under the already broad criminal law protection of copyright and challenge traditional doctrines of targeting of criminal liability. Regarding generative AI, the producer of the end product is the AI, which combines information from different sources rather than the person who programmes the AI with the task to produce certain type of output. Concerning criminal intent, this constellation is not without difficulties. Legal doctrine requires that criminal intent covers all elements of an illegal act. However, the involvement of AI causes uncertainties in the assessment of criminal intent, especially regarding the cognitive aspect, which can be illustrated with the help of a case example. In addition to interpreting the fulfillment of criminal intent, this article reflects on the outcome of the analysis of the principle of ultima ratio and assesses the expediency of the system, from both criminal law and copyright law perspectives in the described situations. This article shows that the current interpretation of the doctrine of criminal intent in the AI context favors famous works. We reach the conclusion that it is not justified to use criminal measures to solve problems created by developing technologies and then utilizing them. The rightholder’s legal position should be secured some other way.