<p><i>Iura novit curia</i> – or <i>iura novit arbiter</i> in the context of international arbitration – is a procedural principle that plays a crucial role in defining how tribunals ascertain and apply the law. In the context of international sports arbitration, its relevance is particularly pronounced in the case law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, where all tribunals are bound to apply Swiss <i>lex arbitrii</i>. Under Swiss law, judges (and by extension, arbitral tribunals seated in Switzerland) are obliged to apply the law <i>ex officio</i>. This entails an automatic duty to ascertain and apply the correct legal rules, even if not invoked by the parties. However, a balance must be established between said duty and the parties’ right to be heard. This dichotomy has impacted the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which establishes that tribunals are not required to request comments on every legal consideration they may adopt, but only on those that may be “surprising.” The Swiss law notion of “surprise” is therefore central in arbitrations before the CAS, highlighting the delicate balance between a tribunal’s obligation to apply the law independently and the procedural rights of the parties to participate meaningfully in the determination of their case.</p>

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Iura novit curia in international sports arbitration: are arbitrators deemed to know the law?

  • Mario Flores Chemor

摘要

Iura novit curia – or iura novit arbiter in the context of international arbitration – is a procedural principle that plays a crucial role in defining how tribunals ascertain and apply the law. In the context of international sports arbitration, its relevance is particularly pronounced in the case law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, where all tribunals are bound to apply Swiss lex arbitrii. Under Swiss law, judges (and by extension, arbitral tribunals seated in Switzerland) are obliged to apply the law ex officio. This entails an automatic duty to ascertain and apply the correct legal rules, even if not invoked by the parties. However, a balance must be established between said duty and the parties’ right to be heard. This dichotomy has impacted the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which establishes that tribunals are not required to request comments on every legal consideration they may adopt, but only on those that may be “surprising.” The Swiss law notion of “surprise” is therefore central in arbitrations before the CAS, highlighting the delicate balance between a tribunal’s obligation to apply the law independently and the procedural rights of the parties to participate meaningfully in the determination of their case.