<p>In this paper I contend with what is considered the ‘myth’ of political neutrality. The critique that sport governing bodies have often failed to be politically neutral is likely to be true on any account of the term. The greater issue this paper deals with is the idea that sport <i>cannot</i> be politically neutral, entailing that its political autonomy is illegitimate and its values antithetical to, or at least in conflict with, more important political ideals. What it means to be neutral is then presumed to entail transcending political issues altogether, which I consider a very extreme interpretation. The result of these critiques tends to promote the alternative of openly politicising sport. My aim is to make sense of the meaning of political neutrality in a way that helps to return to more depoliticised environments in sport. To do this, I rely on the philosophical works of Charles Taylor that have helped to articulate a moral ontology of Liberalism. This perspective provides a framework for thinking about modern political structures as derivations of deeper modern moral sentiments about the Self and its relation to society. I then defend an interpretation of political neutrality as an attempt to guarantee the autonomy of sport by navigating political tensions and demands in a way that holds the values of sport articulated in the social philosophy of Olympism as substantive goods worthy of protection. This perspective helps to frame political neutrality in a substantive form, reconstituting the terms in which we come to understand its legitimate purpose. By justifying a principle of political neutrality in a substantive form, I also defend the view that there are forms of Liberalism that can be hospitable to the exceptional demands made by sport, situating both in a coherent and complementary political system.</p>