Harmonizing Growth and Greens: China’s Balanced Approach
摘要
This study examines the trade-off between place-based environmental regulation and industrial structural transformation. Using the establishment of National Wetland Parks in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate whether rigid conservation zoning imposes opportunity costs that hinder local industrial upgrading.
MethodsUsing panel data for 285 Chinese cities from 2003 to 2022, we estimate the baseline effects within a two-way fixed-effects framework. To address potential endogeneity, we implement an instrumental variable strategy based on hydrological features and control explicitly for transportation infrastructure to support the exclusion restriction. We further construct a dataset on wetland park acreage and industrial land transactions to conduct dose–response and mechanism analyses.
ResultsThe results show a robust and statistically significant negative causal effect of wetland park establishment on local industrial upgrading. Mechanism analyses indicate that this inhibitory effect operates mainly through two channels: factor endowment constraints, whereby conservation zoning restricts the supply of industrial land, and fiscal crowding-out, whereby local governments reallocate resources from productive subsidies to ecological infrastructure. The dose–response analysis shows that the effect is concentrated in large-scale parks, whereas small-scale parks generate only limited structural frictions. Spatial estimates further indicate a pronounced “beggar-thy-neighbor” effect, with constrained industrial capital relocating to neighboring regions.
ConclusionThis paper contributes to the literature on environmental regulation by identifying the micro-level mechanisms through which place-based conservation policies may generate resource-locking effects. The findings reveal a distributional asymmetry in which local jurisdictions bear a disproportionate share of industrial transition costs while supplying ecological public goods of broader significance. These results suggest the need for vertical fiscal transfers to mitigate the resulting incentive incompatibilities.