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<p>In this paper, we introduce a new class of values for cooperative games, named procedural surplus values, determined by procedures of sharing marginal surpluses. Considering the potential influence of coalition size on the solidarity level among players, this class of values combines marginalistic and egalitarian principles based on coalition size. We then provide two axiomatizations for the class of procedural surplus values and discuss its relationships with three other classes of values, including the least square family, the generalized consensus values, and the procedural values.</p>

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The Procedural Surplus Values for Cooperative Games

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月22日

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  • Li Zhang,
  • Gen-Jiu Xu,
  • Hao Sun,
  • Wen-Zhong Li

摘要

In this paper, we introduce a new class of values for cooperative games, named procedural surplus values, determined by procedures of sharing marginal surpluses. Considering the potential influence of coalition size on the solidarity level among players, this class of values combines marginalistic and egalitarian principles based on coalition size. We then provide two axiomatizations for the class of procedural surplus values and discuss its relationships with three other classes of values, including the least square family, the generalized consensus values, and the procedural values.