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<p>To reduce carbon emissions in remanufacturing supply chains (RSCs), original and remanufacturing suppliers in competitive relationships can collaboratively pursue green innovation cooperation with the investment incentives of farsighted manufacturers. Manufacturers must also guarantee that they do not incur excessive self-interest. To this end, we design a green innovation incentive mechanism composed of a manufacturer, an original supplier, and a remanufacturing supplier. To explore the co-opetitive relationship between suppliers, we develop a co-opetitive model to derive the profit-maximizing strategies (noncooperative part) and green innovation cooperation decisions (cooperative part). The results indicate that: (1) The cooperation of two competing suppliers in green innovation improves RSC’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. (2) Compared to noncooperation, the RSC performance under cooperation is not negatively affected by cost difference and the manufacturer’s markup level, reflecting the stability of the model. (3) The green innovation mechanism is effective in enhancing the green innovation level and avoiding manufacturers’ free-riding behavior that undermines the incentives of upstream suppliers. Our proposed co-opetitive model can be regarded as a nested combination of noncooperative and cooperative games. It effectively coordinates the coexistence of green innovation cooperation and price competition.</p>

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Co-opetitive Strategy of Remanufacturing Supply Chain Considering Green Innovation

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月6日

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  • Xiao-Hui Yu,
  • Yan-Ling He,
  • Liu Xu,
  • You Wu,
  • Chao Li

摘要

To reduce carbon emissions in remanufacturing supply chains (RSCs), original and remanufacturing suppliers in competitive relationships can collaboratively pursue green innovation cooperation with the investment incentives of farsighted manufacturers. Manufacturers must also guarantee that they do not incur excessive self-interest. To this end, we design a green innovation incentive mechanism composed of a manufacturer, an original supplier, and a remanufacturing supplier. To explore the co-opetitive relationship between suppliers, we develop a co-opetitive model to derive the profit-maximizing strategies (noncooperative part) and green innovation cooperation decisions (cooperative part). The results indicate that: (1) The cooperation of two competing suppliers in green innovation improves RSC’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. (2) Compared to noncooperation, the RSC performance under cooperation is not negatively affected by cost difference and the manufacturer’s markup level, reflecting the stability of the model. (3) The green innovation mechanism is effective in enhancing the green innovation level and avoiding manufacturers’ free-riding behavior that undermines the incentives of upstream suppliers. Our proposed co-opetitive model can be regarded as a nested combination of noncooperative and cooperative games. It effectively coordinates the coexistence of green innovation cooperation and price competition.