<p>As early new energy vehicles gradually enter the scrapping period, the number of decommissioned batteries has also begun to show a growing trend. It is necessary to recycle waste power batteries to achieve economic value and avoid environmental pollution. We first construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the behavioural choices of the government, enterprises, and consumers. We then analyse the stability of the evolutionary equilibrium of each game player, consider a three-dimensional dynamic system corresponding to the three game players, and propose evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs). Next, we conduct simulations of the model to analyse the impacts of government subsidies, enterprise subsidies, consumer’s psychological loss, potential benefits for enterprises, and environmental governance cost on the behaviours of the three players. Finally, we have a further discussion on dynamic subsidies model and then compared the results of the static model and dynamic subsidies model. We obtain the following findings: (i) Potential benefits for enterprises and government subsidies play a positive role in encouraging enterprises to establish recycling channels. (ii) The government’s regulatory measures are effective. The enterprises achieve a state of stability more quickly in dynamic subsidies model. The dynamic subsidies mechanism is a better choice under some conditions, so it is better for the government to formulate flexible subsidy policies. (iii) Regardless of the level of battery recycling price, consumers always choose the formal recycling channel when enterprises establish recycling channels. (iv) Increasing consumer’s psychological loss has a negative impact on the players’ behaviours.</p>