Evolutionary game analysis of emission-dependent supply chain carbon abatement behaviours considering cap-and-trade mechanism

Green development has become the focus of the global industrial competition. In order to explore the emission-dependent supply chain carbon abatement behaviours, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of high-carbon emission manufacturers and carbon quota suppliers to study the comparisons of the carbon abatement strategy of manufacturers and the trading path of suppliers. Moreover, the influence of related parameters: emission reduction cost coefficient, proportion of carbon quota purchase and transaction cost on the evolutionary game is further analyzed. The results show that: (1) the combination of green technology and carbon quota purchase strategy is the best choice for manufacturers; (2) The proportion of carbon quota purchase is the key parameter, which mainly affects the evolutionary trend of emission-dependent supply chain carbon abatement behaviours; (3) Manufacturers play a critical role in the emission-dependent supply chain system. Numerical simulation is conducted to illustrate the models and validate the findings.