Product Screening in Live stream: An Equilibrium Strategy Analysis Considering Streamer Product Selection and Platform Inspection

Regarding product quality issues in live-streaming e-commerce, this article first analyzes the streamer’s decisions in the product selection stage and the platform’s actions in the product inspection stage, constructing a Stackelberg game model for four different scenarios involving the streamer and the platform. The optimal live-streaming retail price decision for the streamer and the optimal commission rate decision for the platform are obtained. Next, an analytical framework for the evolutionary path of the streamer and the platform is developed, and a two-dimensional dynamic system is used to analyze their evolutionarily stable strategies. Finally, to promote positive cooperation between the streamer and the platform, a simulation analysis of the binary equilibrium strategies under the ideal equilibrium state is conducted. The results indicate that the evolution of strategies for both streamers and platforms is primarily influenced by the probability of a product being selected by the streamer and the probability of passing the platform’s inspection. The system will only stabilize at the strategy set strict product selection, active inspection when both the probability of a product being selected by the streamer and the probability of passing the platform’s inspection are high. Conversely, when both probabilities are low, the system will stabilize at the strategy set lenient product selection, passive inspection, meaning that neither the streamer nor the platform is strict, which will lead to serious product quality issues.