Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Resilience Improvement of Intelligent Contact Centers under Emergencies

The frequent emergencies have caused customer service contact centers to become overcrowded, leading to system crashes. Therefore, the importance of improving the resilience of these contact centers is gaining prominence. This process is both long-term and dynamic. To better understand the conflicts of interest among stakeholders and encourage active participation from contact center departments and customers, we developed a tripartite evolutionary game model. This model aims to investigate the interaction behavior between enterprises, contact center departments, and customers, identifying the specific conditions and influencing factors for improving call center resilience. The study reveals that: 1) The balance of strategies among all three parties is influenced by enterprise support, subsidies, penalties, and stakeholder behaviors. 2) The punishment level enforced by the enterprise and the initial willingness of the enterprise and customer significantly affect the behavior of the contact center department. 3) Subsidies from enterprises can impact customers decisions. Hence, our research provides a detailed explanation of the decision-making choices made by different stakeholders under varied parameter adjustments. Furthermore, we have proposed suggestions to mitigate these impacts.