Investigating Energy-Efficient Consumption and Intervention Mechanisms for the Manufacturing Sector: A Monopolistic Competition

Due to the importance of mechanism evaluation of energy efficiency enhancement in recent years, in this paper, Industrial Energy-Efficiency Programs (IEEPs) are investigated through a supply chain including a manufacturer, an energy producer, and end-users. In this problem, governance also has been considered to optimize energy-saving volume as a leader. To formulate this multi-agent problem, a novel strategic game is presented using the Cournot model under two scenarios. These scenarios are extended to examine the impact of industrial energy efficiency enhancement in a multi-agent environment. Also, a novel utility function is considered to describe consumer behavior in residential energy consumption. Finally, a comprehensive parametric and numerical study is performed on the proposed model using a real data case study. The results show the advantage of the proposed adjustments to improve energy-saving and maximize the performance of the considered IEEP. Also, the taxation policies that include the consumer and industrial energy taxes can be mentioned as successful policies to control the total consumption and boost the energy-saving process compared to the manufacturer subsidy. This paper explains the application of sustainable energy management through the residential and industrial sectors with monopolistic competition.