The nature of what is referred to as “pseudotechnology” and its differences from genuine technologies have been comparatively underexamined within the field of the philosophy of technology. An exception to this claim is the theoretical work of S. O. Hansson (2020), who has proposed a criterion for distinguishing between technologies and pseudotechnologies grounded in the concept of “non-functional principles.” According to this author, pseudotechnologies are characterized by being based on irreparably non-functional principles – that is, principles that cannot give rise to technologies suitable for the intended aims. Hansson, however, does not examine the reasons why certain principles are irreparably non-functional. Consequently, in this paper, we propose an expansion of his criterion, first, by elucidating what makes some principles non-functional and, second, by examining the processes involved in the generation of technologies. We will argue, in particular, that what renders principles non-functional is the falsity of the declarative statements on which such principles are grounded, and that pseudotechnologies present class differences from genuine technologies with respect to their production and validation processes.
