<p>In “The Apt Curation Model: An Epistemic Virtue Theory of AI-assisted Authorship” (<i>Philosophy &amp; Technology</i> 39 (2026)) Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues argues that we should conceive of the author in AI-supported processes as an <i>apt curator of texts.</i> He pleads for extending the accurate-adroit-apt framework towards human-AI authorship and developing four curatorial virtues: dialogical, evaluative, integrative, and architectural. This ‘Apt Curation Problem’ solves the problems constituted by the lack of a locus for the epistemic and semantic properties of authorship in the case of AI-assisted text production. In this commentary on Rodrigues’ article, I aim to do three things: (1) summarize and praise the article; (2) reframe the apt curation model as a possible move in the <i>conceptual engineering</i> of AI and authorship; and (3) I argue that the apt curation model stands in need of more <i>conceptual ethics</i> – the metaphilosophical practice of giving reasons for the (sustained) use of a concept. Before we can accept new models of authorship, we still have to weigh our concerns and goals associated with construing authorship in the context of AI in Rodrigues’ way, against other concerns and goals that might drive other conceptualizations, given our current capacities and circumstances.</p>

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The Apt Curation Model and the Need for More Conceptual Ethics of AI and Authorship

  • Warmhold Jan Thomas Mollema

摘要

In “The Apt Curation Model: An Epistemic Virtue Theory of AI-assisted Authorship” (Philosophy & Technology 39 (2026)) Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues argues that we should conceive of the author in AI-supported processes as an apt curator of texts. He pleads for extending the accurate-adroit-apt framework towards human-AI authorship and developing four curatorial virtues: dialogical, evaluative, integrative, and architectural. This ‘Apt Curation Problem’ solves the problems constituted by the lack of a locus for the epistemic and semantic properties of authorship in the case of AI-assisted text production. In this commentary on Rodrigues’ article, I aim to do three things: (1) summarize and praise the article; (2) reframe the apt curation model as a possible move in the conceptual engineering of AI and authorship; and (3) I argue that the apt curation model stands in need of more conceptual ethics – the metaphilosophical practice of giving reasons for the (sustained) use of a concept. Before we can accept new models of authorship, we still have to weigh our concerns and goals associated with construing authorship in the context of AI in Rodrigues’ way, against other concerns and goals that might drive other conceptualizations, given our current capacities and circumstances.