<p>This paper explores the implications of applying Kantianism, traditionally focused on human moral agents, to the ethics of human–robot interaction. Kantian approaches have often been regarded as ineffective for assessing whether non-human entities like robots deserve moral consideration. However, this paper argues that Kantian resources provide more substantial support for the moral consideration of robots and the value of human–robot relationships than is commonly assumed. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the paper examines Kant’s doctrine of ends in themselves, which has traditionally viewed robots solely as instrumental means. Second, it discusses a Kantian perspective on indirect duties, emphasizing how human interactions with robots influence human virtue and moral feeling. This framework justifies norms against cruel behavior toward robots to protect one’s moral character but remains insufficient as it only prescribes “avoiding cruelty insofar as it affects one’s character.” Finally, to address this limitation, the paper introduces a Kantian perspective grounded in the duty to promote others’ happiness as an obligatory end. This approach enables the derivation of a duty to protect human–robot relationships based on moral concern for individuals who find happiness through such relationships.</p>