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<p>Baron claims that we can, given a sound inductive basis, appropriately trust unexplainable AI systems. Fan disagrees and claims that the opacity of these systems disqualifies them as appropriate objects of trust. In this response, I argue that Baron’s case for trusting unexplainable AI systems is stronger than Fan holds. Along the way, I suggest some implications for thinking about trusting AI systems.</p>

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AI, Trust and Reliability

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月7日

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  • Ian Robertson

摘要

Baron claims that we can, given a sound inductive basis, appropriately trust unexplainable AI systems. Fan disagrees and claims that the opacity of these systems disqualifies them as appropriate objects of trust. In this response, I argue that Baron’s case for trusting unexplainable AI systems is stronger than Fan holds. Along the way, I suggest some implications for thinking about trusting AI systems.