<p>In an interesting and provocative article in <i>Philosophy and Technology</i>, Brand (<CitationRef CitationID="CR2">2025</CitationRef>) argues that AI agents lack the capacities for vulnerability, rational accountability, and empathy that are characteristic of human decision-makers. As a result, one might worry that even if algorithm-assisted decision-making could improve accuracy, it might compromise ethical values such as fairness and compassion. However, I argue there are significant ethical trade-offs to be faced either way—whether in preserving <i>or</i> reducing human discretion over algorithmically-assisted decision processes. On the one hand, I note both theoretical and empirical reasons to think that algorithms reducing human discretion could sometimes improve not only accuracy, but also fairness and leniency, within certain specific conditions and decision contexts. On the other hand, there is also danger in unrestricted consequentialist approaches to algorithm-assisted decision-making, which might be too dismissive of accountability and personal autonomy. I close by briefly distinguishing human-centered decision-making from human-centered <i>communication</i>. I suggest that human-centered communication might be supported even if human decision-making discretion is reduced.</p>

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Empathy, Fairness, and Ethical Trade-Offs in Human-Centered Versus Algorithm-Driven Decision-Making

  • Reuben Sass

摘要

In an interesting and provocative article in Philosophy and Technology, Brand (2025) argues that AI agents lack the capacities for vulnerability, rational accountability, and empathy that are characteristic of human decision-makers. As a result, one might worry that even if algorithm-assisted decision-making could improve accuracy, it might compromise ethical values such as fairness and compassion. However, I argue there are significant ethical trade-offs to be faced either way—whether in preserving or reducing human discretion over algorithmically-assisted decision processes. On the one hand, I note both theoretical and empirical reasons to think that algorithms reducing human discretion could sometimes improve not only accuracy, but also fairness and leniency, within certain specific conditions and decision contexts. On the other hand, there is also danger in unrestricted consequentialist approaches to algorithm-assisted decision-making, which might be too dismissive of accountability and personal autonomy. I close by briefly distinguishing human-centered decision-making from human-centered communication. I suggest that human-centered communication might be supported even if human decision-making discretion is reduced.