Scholarlink

<p>In “Against Personalized AI Moral Advisors” (Philosophy &amp; Technology, 38(2):45, 2025), Muriel Leuenberger has argued that the personal nature of practical deliberation, which I stressed in my “Can AI Rely on the Systematicity of Truth? The Challenge of Modelling Normative Domains” (Philosophy &amp; Technology, 38(34):1 -27, 2025a), counterintuitively militates <i>against</i> the development of personalized AI moral advisors and in favour of generalist AI moral advisors. Here, I take up and develop this line of thought, drawing out how the asystematicity of normative domains reveals the fundamental limitations of both personalized and generalist AI moral advisors.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

On the Fundamental Limitations of AI Moral Advisors

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月20日

查看全文
  • Matthieu Queloz

摘要

In “Against Personalized AI Moral Advisors” (Philosophy & Technology, 38(2):45, 2025), Muriel Leuenberger has argued that the personal nature of practical deliberation, which I stressed in my “Can AI Rely on the Systematicity of Truth? The Challenge of Modelling Normative Domains” (Philosophy & Technology, 38(34):1 -27, 2025a), counterintuitively militates against the development of personalized AI moral advisors and in favour of generalist AI moral advisors. Here, I take up and develop this line of thought, drawing out how the asystematicity of normative domains reveals the fundamental limitations of both personalized and generalist AI moral advisors.