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<p>We establish a modified notion of Nash equilibrium learning—convergence of the population state to the Nash equilibria set—in a generalization of the standard population games and evolutionary dynamics framework using system-theoretic passivity methods. In this setting, we allow each strategy to involve a sequence of sub-tasks that must be completed before strategy revision so long as the durations of the sub-tasks can be modeled with Erlang or exponential distributions. Furthermore, several canonical classes of natural learning rules are established and useful properties are derived.</p>

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Population Games with Sub-Strategies and Evolutionary Nash Equilibrium Learning

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月17日

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  • Matthew S. Hankins,
  • Semih Kara,
  • Nuno C. Martins,
  • Murat Arcak

摘要

We establish a modified notion of Nash equilibrium learning—convergence of the population state to the Nash equilibria set—in a generalization of the standard population games and evolutionary dynamics framework using system-theoretic passivity methods. In this setting, we allow each strategy to involve a sequence of sub-tasks that must be completed before strategy revision so long as the durations of the sub-tasks can be modeled with Erlang or exponential distributions. Furthermore, several canonical classes of natural learning rules are established and useful properties are derived.