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<p>Stochastic games constitute an important class of sequential decision making problems where multiple agents interact in a stochastic environment with competing objectives. In this paper, we develop evolutionary theory for stochastic games (in the lines of evolutionary game theory) and develop the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies which was initiated by Flesch et al. [<CitationRef CitationID="CR10">10</CitationRef>]. Our main contribution is introducing the appropriate replicator dynamics corresponding to the stochastic game and the study of the dynamic stability of evolutionarily stable strategies with respect to the replicator dynamics.</p>

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Replicator Dynamics for Stochastic Games

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月24日

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  • Divya Murali,
  • K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao,
  • A. J. Shaiju

摘要

Stochastic games constitute an important class of sequential decision making problems where multiple agents interact in a stochastic environment with competing objectives. In this paper, we develop evolutionary theory for stochastic games (in the lines of evolutionary game theory) and develop the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies which was initiated by Flesch et al. [10]. Our main contribution is introducing the appropriate replicator dynamics corresponding to the stochastic game and the study of the dynamic stability of evolutionarily stable strategies with respect to the replicator dynamics.