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<p>A competitive bargaining set is a finite collection of allocation, each of them being supported by a coalition, characterized by internal and external stability. Perticularly, each core allocation, together the set of all consumers represents a competitive bargaining set. The existence of the competitive bargaining set is proved for exchange economies if the preferences are represented by continuous monotonic utility functions. A new concept extending the classical notion of core is proposed.</p>

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Bargaining Dynamics in Abstract Exchange Economies

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月22日

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  • David Barilla

摘要

A competitive bargaining set is a finite collection of allocation, each of them being supported by a coalition, characterized by internal and external stability. Perticularly, each core allocation, together the set of all consumers represents a competitive bargaining set. The existence of the competitive bargaining set is proved for exchange economies if the preferences are represented by continuous monotonic utility functions. A new concept extending the classical notion of core is proposed.