<p>When scientists decide to perform an experiment, they expect that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. I argue that, beyond the theoretically motivated research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) an experiment may be particularly pursuitworthy because it addresses a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental facilities may give rise to research questions in the first place. In this sense experimental pursuitworthiness has a ‘life of its own.’ My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.</p>