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<p>Philosophers of science have variously tried to characterize how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and distinguish them from how-actually explanations (HAEs). I argue that existing contributions to this debate have failed to pay attention to the different, but complementary, functions possibilities play in scientific explanations. To bring these functions to the fore, I introduce a distinction between what I call <i>elucidating</i> and <i>embedding</i> HPEs. While elucidating HPEs specify and demonstrate possible processes for a given research target, embedding HPEs demonstrate how the research target fits into a space of suitably constrained possibilities. I specify both functions of HPE with reference to two case studies from origins-of-life research. I contrast my distinction with an alternative proposal by Wirling and Grüne-Yanoff (<CitationRef CitationID="CR27">2024</CitationRef>) to highlight that focusing on the <i>functions</i>, rather than <i>types</i>, of possibilities in explanation is better suited to account for key scientific practices.</p>

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Elucidating and embedding: two functions of how-possibly explanations

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月14日

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  • Franziska Reinhard

摘要

Philosophers of science have variously tried to characterize how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and distinguish them from how-actually explanations (HAEs). I argue that existing contributions to this debate have failed to pay attention to the different, but complementary, functions possibilities play in scientific explanations. To bring these functions to the fore, I introduce a distinction between what I call elucidating and embedding HPEs. While elucidating HPEs specify and demonstrate possible processes for a given research target, embedding HPEs demonstrate how the research target fits into a space of suitably constrained possibilities. I specify both functions of HPE with reference to two case studies from origins-of-life research. I contrast my distinction with an alternative proposal by Wirling and Grüne-Yanoff (2024) to highlight that focusing on the functions, rather than types, of possibilities in explanation is better suited to account for key scientific practices.