<p>The representation-hungry challenge is a popular challenge leveled against anti-representational approaches to the mind sciences. It contends that any <i>general</i> anti-representationalist conclusion is presently premature, as anti-representationalists have not yet offered a non-representational account of representation-hungry cognition; that is, cognition aimed at absent or abstract targets. Anti-representationalist tried to face this challenge in a number of different ways, but these attempts failed to convince representationalists. Hence, the need for an alternative way to handle the challenge. Here, I provide such an alternative: rather than facing the representation-hungry challenge, I will try to <i>defuse</i> it, showing that it does arise in any <i>meaningful</i> form. I’ll do so by arguing that the challenge hinges on a presupposition that is factually false, and so that the challenge fails to arise. Additionally, I will argue that even if the challenge were to arise, it won’t be a <i>serious</i> challenge to anti-representationalism. For, given certain, widespread representationalists assumptions, must concede that anti-representationalists have already met the challenge, and that no additional explanatory work is required on their part.</p>