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<p>This paper examines the relationship between two influential accounts of assertion: Robert Stalnaker’s model of assertion as a proposal to update the common ground (CG), and Timothy Williamson’s normative account, which holds that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). While often treated as distinct or even competing frameworks, I argue that each view faces explanatory gaps that the other is well positioned to fill. While Stalnaker’s model struggles to distinguish assertions from other CG-updating speech acts like assumptions or conjectures, Williamson’s KNA lacks an independently motivated descriptive criterion for identifying the speech act it regulates. I propose a hybrid view in which assertion is defined both by its role in updating the CG and by its subjection to the knowledge norm. This account helps individuate assertion within a broader class of assertoric speech acts by their submission to KNA, and grounds Williamson’s constitutivity claim in the conversational structure outlined by Stalnaker. The paper concludes by addressing potential compatibility challenges between the two frameworks and suggests that their integration yields a philosophically stronger account—one that reflects the dual role of assertion as both a pragmatic move and an epistemically assessable commitment.</p>

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Constitutive Norms of Assertion and the Common Ground, or How and Why Do We Play the Assertion game?

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月6日

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  • Maciej Tarnowski

摘要

This paper examines the relationship between two influential accounts of assertion: Robert Stalnaker’s model of assertion as a proposal to update the common ground (CG), and Timothy Williamson’s normative account, which holds that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). While often treated as distinct or even competing frameworks, I argue that each view faces explanatory gaps that the other is well positioned to fill. While Stalnaker’s model struggles to distinguish assertions from other CG-updating speech acts like assumptions or conjectures, Williamson’s KNA lacks an independently motivated descriptive criterion for identifying the speech act it regulates. I propose a hybrid view in which assertion is defined both by its role in updating the CG and by its subjection to the knowledge norm. This account helps individuate assertion within a broader class of assertoric speech acts by their submission to KNA, and grounds Williamson’s constitutivity claim in the conversational structure outlined by Stalnaker. The paper concludes by addressing potential compatibility challenges between the two frameworks and suggests that their integration yields a philosophically stronger account—one that reflects the dual role of assertion as both a pragmatic move and an epistemically assessable commitment.