<p>In reply to views that regard expressive actions as lacking a point or as having at most an external, contingent one, Bennett argues that they have a point that is internal insofar as the agent themselves can recognize it as the purpose of their action. This paper investigates what this internal point could be. Bennett argues that the point of expressive actions is to <i>mark</i> some aspects of a situation as significant. I will argue, however, that, in some central cases of expressive action, the idea of marking cannot coherently apprehend their internal point. In such cases —or so I contend— a third party might adequately regard marking as the point of someone else’s action, but the agent themselves could not reflectively endorse it as the point of their own action. It follows that marking cannot be the internal point of those expressive actions insofar as it fails <i>the reflective endorsement test</i>. I will finally sketch an alternative view about the point of expressive action in such central cases, one that may pass this test. This alternative approach hinges on the idea of <i>constitution</i>; more specifically, I will argue that in some central cases the internal point of expressive action is not marking but constituting. </p>