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<p>The advent of differentiated prices for consuming (buying) and injecting (selling) electricity at the residential level promotes the emergence of local peer-to-peer electricity markets for prosumers, which can deliver savings to participants as long as an attractive cost sharing mechanism can be designed. Building on cooperative game theory models that have been proposed in the literature, we define the uniform price core, a class of desirable distribution of savings in this context, and prove constructively that it is not empty. We propose the shadow price imputation, a computationally efficient stable uniform price imputation, which we show to be equivalent to a dual imputation in the sense of cooperative linear production games. In the second part of the paper, we compare the shadow price imputation to other imputations in the uniform price core through the lens of fairness. To overcome the challenge of tractability for larger numbers of participants, we extend an existing sampling methodology and apply it to optimization problems devised to obtain a fair imputation. The long-term incentive implications for different stakeholders, as well as a generalization to a stochastic case where the uncertainty in renewable production and local demand is considered, are also discussed. We present theoretical results and numerical experiments and examples to illustrate our approach.</p>

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Stable and fair uniform price allocations of community choice aggregation gains in retail electricity markets

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月7日

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  • Tomas Valencia Zuluaga,
  • Shmuel S. Oren

摘要

The advent of differentiated prices for consuming (buying) and injecting (selling) electricity at the residential level promotes the emergence of local peer-to-peer electricity markets for prosumers, which can deliver savings to participants as long as an attractive cost sharing mechanism can be designed. Building on cooperative game theory models that have been proposed in the literature, we define the uniform price core, a class of desirable distribution of savings in this context, and prove constructively that it is not empty. We propose the shadow price imputation, a computationally efficient stable uniform price imputation, which we show to be equivalent to a dual imputation in the sense of cooperative linear production games. In the second part of the paper, we compare the shadow price imputation to other imputations in the uniform price core through the lens of fairness. To overcome the challenge of tractability for larger numbers of participants, we extend an existing sampling methodology and apply it to optimization problems devised to obtain a fair imputation. The long-term incentive implications for different stakeholders, as well as a generalization to a stochastic case where the uncertainty in renewable production and local demand is considered, are also discussed. We present theoretical results and numerical experiments and examples to illustrate our approach.