Leistungssportforschung in Deutschland

The aim of this article is to theoretically model and empirically test the decision-making behavior of scientists in the field of externally funded competitive sport research. Taking into account the specific funding structures, the relationships between researchers, universities, and research funding organizations, in particular the BISp (“Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft”), are examined. The paper integrates principal–agent theory and structuration theory to explain the specific decision constellations in elite sport research. Researchers as agents act on the basis of their preferences, which can be channeled by setting incentives. Universities, as principals, strive for research performance, while the BISp promotes research through incentives, in order to pass on findings to national (sport-governing) federations. Information asymmetries lead to principal–agent problems. Hypotheses are derived from the comprehensive theoretical model and tested with empirical data from the BISp-funded project “Sports Science at Universities—Structural Conditions and Perspectives”. The role of the BISp as a market leader in awarding research projects in the field of competitive sport was confirmed. From the point of view of researchers, the reputation of applicants is of central importance when applying for third-party funding in competitive sport, both in absolute terms and in relation to other research fields. There is a general dissatisfaction on the part of sport practitioners, which is also reflected in their preference for cooperation partners other than universities. The dominance of training science research in the field of competitive sport was also confirmed. The theoretical model allows for critical discussion and further empirical testing.