<p>It is argued that Gergen’s article on <i>Social Psychology as History</i> must be considered a masterpiece of critical reflection that foresaw developments in psychology that are discussed today. Assumptions about the division of natural and social domains, the idea that bio-psychological processes are exempt from historical analysis and that the concept of society can be neglected in considerations of history are challenged. Developing the general notion of <i>history as method</i>, the article addresses the reality that, despite convincing arguments, neither social psychology nor Gergen himself kept to the recommendations developed in the argument. The reasons proposed include the <i>methodologism</i> of psychology, the declining status of the humanities (including history), the presentism inherent in the discipline, and the power of an academic subjectivity that has no incentives to change existing knowledge practices. The fact that psychology is as much a social as an epistemic project that contains non-rational processes is discussed. It is argued that aligning psychology with the humanities remains an idealistic, albeit epistemically necessary, recommendation.</p>