<p>The objective of this study is to analyze the impact of implementing a refund policy on the pricing and profitability of two competing centralized dual-channel supply chains. Specifically, the study focuses on the situation where one supply chain allows refunds while its opponent does not. Three scenarios are considered – a Bertrand game and two sequential Stackelberg games. The equilibrium prices and profits have been examined through four cases. First, the optimal refund prices across the three scenarios have been compared. Second, comparisons of prices and profits for cases with and without refunds have been made. Third, prices and profits have been compared for similar market positions. Fourth, prices and profits have been compared for different market positions. It was found that the optimal refund prices of the refund offering supply chain vary according to certain ranges of the price sensitivity coefficient for each of the four cases. Similar results were found in the case of the optimal profits of the refund offering supply chain and its non-refund offering competitor. This paper offers supply chains valuable managerial insights on how to maintain their price sensitivities in order to refund customers while simultaneously outperforming competitors who do not offer refunds in each of the three scenarios. While competition between conventional closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) have been extensively examined, the effect of the introduction of refund by one of the two competing and consolidated supply chains with dual channels and with equal market share on their optimal prices and profits have not been studied much. We fill this gap through this work. The findings of this work can be used by managers of companies to take up favourable market positions so as to gain maximum benefits.</p>