Decision analysis of cooperative governance of public health emergencies

Public health emergency prevention and control are long-term and dynamic, how to effectively prevent and control the public health emergency has become an urgent problem to be solved. Aiming at the problem of cooperative governance in public health emergencies, we use the evolutionary game method to build a dynamic evolutionary model with two local governments from the perspective of heterogeneity, and analyze the dynamic evolutionary stability strategy and the evolutionary process of cooperative governance of local governments. We find that local government efforts to deal with public emergencies are negatively related to the benefits of free-riding and the costs of positive cooperation, but positively related to the level of punishment and the losses caused by negative cooperation. We also find that the heterogeneity of local governments is an important reason for the failure of a stable cooperative governance model to form spontaneously. The punishment of the superior government does not eliminate the free-riding phenomenon, and the punishment of the superior government should be greater than the benefits obtained by the local government through free-riding. From the evolution process, the heterogeneity coefficient and the punishment of the superior government will speed up the evolution of the two parties to a stable strategy. Free-riding slows down the speed at which local governments choose positive cooperation strategies, and speeds up the speed at which local governments choose negative cooperation strategies. This study can provide decision support for local governments to effectively participate in public health emergency prevention and control.