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Purpose <p>Healthcare systems are increasingly targeted by cyberattacks, posing risks to patient safety and continuity of care. Although the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mandates technical and organisational safeguards, cybersecurity maturity in healthcare remains uneven. This study analyses major publicly documented cyber incidents in Czech hospitals and benchmarks them against selected European cases to identify recurring vulnerabilities and governance implications.</p> Methods <p>An exploratory qualitative comparative case analysis was conducted of three publicly reported cyber incidents affecting Czech hospitals (2019–2020). Data were derived exclusively from publicly accessible sources, including national cybersecurity authority communications, governmental documents, peer-reviewed literature, and established media reporting. Cases were assessed against GDPR Articles 32–34 and relevant ENISA guidance using a matrix-based analytical framework covering technical safeguards, preparedness, governance and resilience implications. Four high-impact European healthcare incidents (Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and France) were included for comparative benchmarking.</p> Results <p>Publicly available accounts suggested recurring weaknesses in technical safeguards and organisational preparedness, including limited network segmentation, legacy endpoint protection, insufficient staff training, and constrained incident response capacity. These patterns suggested gaps between regulatory requirements and practical resilience. European cases revealed similar vulnerabilities, in some instances resulting in large-scale service disruption and reported clinical risk. Reactive governance responses and delayed detection were common features.</p> Conclusions <p>Cybersecurity should be embedded within health technology governance and system resilience rather than treated solely as a compliance obligation. Findings suggest that resilience-oriented governance may complement compliance-based regulation in strengthening preparedness. Strengthening executive accountability and preparedness mechanisms may enhance resilience in digitally dependent healthcare systems.</p>

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From GDPR compliance to cyber resilience: Systemic vulnerabilities in Czech healthcare technology

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月22日

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  • Anna Horňáková,
  • David Jirsa,
  • Martin Staněk,
  • Petr Šmíd

摘要

Purpose

Healthcare systems are increasingly targeted by cyberattacks, posing risks to patient safety and continuity of care. Although the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mandates technical and organisational safeguards, cybersecurity maturity in healthcare remains uneven. This study analyses major publicly documented cyber incidents in Czech hospitals and benchmarks them against selected European cases to identify recurring vulnerabilities and governance implications.

Methods

An exploratory qualitative comparative case analysis was conducted of three publicly reported cyber incidents affecting Czech hospitals (2019–2020). Data were derived exclusively from publicly accessible sources, including national cybersecurity authority communications, governmental documents, peer-reviewed literature, and established media reporting. Cases were assessed against GDPR Articles 32–34 and relevant ENISA guidance using a matrix-based analytical framework covering technical safeguards, preparedness, governance and resilience implications. Four high-impact European healthcare incidents (Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and France) were included for comparative benchmarking.

Results

Publicly available accounts suggested recurring weaknesses in technical safeguards and organisational preparedness, including limited network segmentation, legacy endpoint protection, insufficient staff training, and constrained incident response capacity. These patterns suggested gaps between regulatory requirements and practical resilience. European cases revealed similar vulnerabilities, in some instances resulting in large-scale service disruption and reported clinical risk. Reactive governance responses and delayed detection were common features.

Conclusions

Cybersecurity should be embedded within health technology governance and system resilience rather than treated solely as a compliance obligation. Findings suggest that resilience-oriented governance may complement compliance-based regulation in strengthening preparedness. Strengthening executive accountability and preparedness mechanisms may enhance resilience in digitally dependent healthcare systems.