<p>Online review systems are central to trust formation and governance on e-commerce platforms, yet fake reviews remain persistent despite ongoing regulatory efforts. Existing studies offer limited insight into how governance outcomes evolve over time. This study examines fake review governance from an evolutionary perspective by developing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving platforms, merchants, and consumers, analyzing how institutional parameters and initial conditions jointly shape long-term strategic trajectories. The results show that governance effectiveness does not improve linearly with regulatory intensity. Instead, the system may converge to multiple stable equilibria and exhibit strong path dependence. Early tolerance of review manipulation can lock the market into low-quality governance states, while later regulatory strengthening may fail to reverse these trajectories. Platform regulation affects merchant behavior in a nonlinear manner once key parameters cross-critical thresholds. Consumer behavior does not directly determine equilibrium selection, but instead influences the speed of strategic adjustment through information feedback mechanisms. These findings highlight the importance of early institutional design and sustained incentive alignment in platform governance.</p>