The impacts of platform owner entry on prospective complementors’ intention to join: Discouraged by deterrent or attracted by good reputation

In the context of e-commerce, platform owner entry into complementary markets has become a prevalent strategy. However, the impact of this strategy on prospective complementors’ intention to join remains unclear. To address the research gap, this study constructs a research model based on signal theory and transaction cost theory. By analyzing primary data on Jingdong, a prominent e-commerce platform in China, the results suggest that the platform owner entry heightens competition intensity within the platform, thereby sending “threat signals” to prospective complementors. Besides, platform owner entry also enhances the social identity of the platform, thereby sending “opportunity signals”. Furthermore, these signals are evaluated by prospective complementors to form expected transaction costs that influence their intention to join. The results also indicate that the reputation of prospective complementors and market uncertainty, to varying degrees, modify the outcomes of the joining intention. This study contributes to the literature on platform owner entry by extending the theoretical perspective and deepening the understanding of its influential mechanisms. Additionally, this study provides valuable practical insights for both platform owners and complementors.