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<p>As robotic agents become increasingly integrated into children’s lives, understanding how children conceptualize robots in relation to living and non-living entities is essential. This study investigates the developmental trajectory of children’s anthropomorphism of robotic agents, testing whether they attribute mental states to robots similarly to how they do for humans, animals, toys, or inanimate objects. Drawing on the ontological category hypothesis—which proposes that children may classify robots as a distinct kind—we explored whether children perceive robots as “sort-of” alive. A sample of 126 children aged 4 to 10 years completed an adapted version of the Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire – Child Form (IDAQ-CF), evaluating six agents: a human, a dog, a humanoid robot (NAO), an animaloid robot (Pleo), a toy, and a box. Results revealed a stairstep pattern of mental state attribution: children consistently attributed mental states to robots more than to inanimate objects but less than to living beings. These patterns remained stable across the age range, suggesting that robots occupy a cognitively ambiguous space rather than fitting into existing ontological categories. We discuss implications for developmental theory, measurement of anthropomorphism, and outline design-relevant consideration for robot use in child-centered settings.</p>

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Developmental Trajectories in Children’s Anthropomorphism of Robotic, Living and Non-Living Agents

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月15日

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  • Kristyn Sommer,
  • Sarah E. Sweezy,
  • Matti Wilks

摘要

As robotic agents become increasingly integrated into children’s lives, understanding how children conceptualize robots in relation to living and non-living entities is essential. This study investigates the developmental trajectory of children’s anthropomorphism of robotic agents, testing whether they attribute mental states to robots similarly to how they do for humans, animals, toys, or inanimate objects. Drawing on the ontological category hypothesis—which proposes that children may classify robots as a distinct kind—we explored whether children perceive robots as “sort-of” alive. A sample of 126 children aged 4 to 10 years completed an adapted version of the Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire – Child Form (IDAQ-CF), evaluating six agents: a human, a dog, a humanoid robot (NAO), an animaloid robot (Pleo), a toy, and a box. Results revealed a stairstep pattern of mental state attribution: children consistently attributed mental states to robots more than to inanimate objects but less than to living beings. These patterns remained stable across the age range, suggesting that robots occupy a cognitively ambiguous space rather than fitting into existing ontological categories. We discuss implications for developmental theory, measurement of anthropomorphism, and outline design-relevant consideration for robot use in child-centered settings.