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<p>We study two-player asymmetric stochastic games using evolutionary game theory. Building on Flesch et al. (2013), we model these games as multi-population games, allowing players to have distinct identities and strategies. We extend the evolutionary stochastic game framework by defining stationary Nash equilibria, evolutionarily stable strategies, evolutionarily stable sets, and strict equilibrium sets, and we introduce replicator dynamics for asymmetric games. Asymmetry and the presence of separate populations yield stronger results on static and dynamic stability than in the symmetric case. Further, we illustrate the dynamic stability of these sets through examples.</p>

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Asymmetric stochastic games: an evolutionary approach

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月2日

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  • Divya Murali,
  • A. J. Shaiju

摘要

We study two-player asymmetric stochastic games using evolutionary game theory. Building on Flesch et al. (2013), we model these games as multi-population games, allowing players to have distinct identities and strategies. We extend the evolutionary stochastic game framework by defining stationary Nash equilibria, evolutionarily stable strategies, evolutionarily stable sets, and strict equilibrium sets, and we introduce replicator dynamics for asymmetric games. Asymmetry and the presence of separate populations yield stronger results on static and dynamic stability than in the symmetric case. Further, we illustrate the dynamic stability of these sets through examples.