<p>In recent years, the credit guarantee has received much attention as an effective scheme for supply chain financing. However, its financing effectiveness and coordinating role have not been comprehensive explored in the context of risk-averse attitudes, particularly concerning supply chain risk spillovers. This study introduces a novel credit guarantee supply chain framework, featuring a bank, a supplier, and a retailer, each displaying varying degrees of risk aversion. Employing the conditional value-at-risk criterion, we investigate the impact of risk-averse attitudes on equilibrium decisions and yield several insights. Initially, in addressing scenarios involving multiple risk-averse agents, we provide a optimal wholesale price for the supplier under more general conditions, which characterizes the intuitive nature of supply chain risk spillovers. Additionally, we establish a framework to assess the risk-averse level of the entire supply chain, revealing that the impact of the credit guarantee on it mainly depends on the relative risk-averse levels of the bank and the supplier. Lastly, we outline a necessary condition capturing the retailer’s tolerance to market risk, a determinant factor for the credit guarantee’s efficacy in coordinating the supply chain.</p>