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<p>The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the de facto in-vehicle backbone but lacks native authentication, confidentiality, and freshness, leaving systems vulnerable to injection, spoofing, and replay. This paper presents CAN-TFP, a lightweight, well-engineered authentication scheme for real-time CAN communication that combines truncated keyed message fingerprints with time-synchronized freshness tokens. Rather than introducing new cryptographic primitives, CAN-TFP carefully navigates the intersection of Classic CAN’s 8-byte payload constraint, hard real-time deadlines, and resource-limited ECU deployments. We survey representative CAN authentication schemes—AUTOSAR SecOC, LiBrA-CAN, Mini-MAC, and recent lightweight proposals—identify the gap that motivates the design, and evaluate CAN-TFP against latency, bandwidth, and replay protection criteria. Experimental results on a gateway-class platform show 45.3 µs signing latency and 12.5% bandwidth overhead, a 66% reduction relative to SecOC, while providing per-frame freshness without explicit counter synchronization. Security trade-offs, deployment assumptions, and platform limitations are discussed explicitly.</p>

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CAN-TFP: A Time-Synchronized Fingerprinting Protocol for Secure In-Vehicle Communication

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月31日

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  • Sebastian Soler Castaneda,
  • Minchul Lee

摘要

The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is the de facto in-vehicle backbone but lacks native authentication, confidentiality, and freshness, leaving systems vulnerable to injection, spoofing, and replay. This paper presents CAN-TFP, a lightweight, well-engineered authentication scheme for real-time CAN communication that combines truncated keyed message fingerprints with time-synchronized freshness tokens. Rather than introducing new cryptographic primitives, CAN-TFP carefully navigates the intersection of Classic CAN’s 8-byte payload constraint, hard real-time deadlines, and resource-limited ECU deployments. We survey representative CAN authentication schemes—AUTOSAR SecOC, LiBrA-CAN, Mini-MAC, and recent lightweight proposals—identify the gap that motivates the design, and evaluate CAN-TFP against latency, bandwidth, and replay protection criteria. Experimental results on a gateway-class platform show 45.3 µs signing latency and 12.5% bandwidth overhead, a 66% reduction relative to SecOC, while providing per-frame freshness without explicit counter synchronization. Security trade-offs, deployment assumptions, and platform limitations are discussed explicitly.