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<p>Malicious drone use has emerged as a growing challenge for transportation security, particularly for airports, transportation hubs, and other critical infrastructure that depend on continuous operation, protected airspace, and coordination among critical nodes. While existing research has largely focused on defensive technologies, regulatory frameworks, or non-adversarial flight-safety incidents, systematic empirical evidence on real-world malicious drone incidents remains limited. To address this gap, this study constructs an open-source database of 131 validated malicious drone incidents based on news reports, official releases, court and investigation records, academic publications, and security research materials, and conducts statistical analysis by attack type, adversary type, and target scenario. The results show that, within the open-source observable and validated sample, physically destructive forms account for 85.5% of incidents; meanwhile, significant associations are identified between target scenarios and attack type, adversary type, and casualty severity. In particular, airports and transportation-related critical infrastructure are highly vulnerable not only to direct damage, but also to low-altitude intrusion, reconnaissance, disruption, and cascading operational effects. These findings provide empirical support for threat identification, scenario-based protection, and response planning in transportation security.</p>

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Malicious drone incidents and transportation security: An empirical analysis based on open-source data

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月27日

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  • Xinyu Hao,
  • Chenglin Yang,
  • Hua Jin

摘要

Malicious drone use has emerged as a growing challenge for transportation security, particularly for airports, transportation hubs, and other critical infrastructure that depend on continuous operation, protected airspace, and coordination among critical nodes. While existing research has largely focused on defensive technologies, regulatory frameworks, or non-adversarial flight-safety incidents, systematic empirical evidence on real-world malicious drone incidents remains limited. To address this gap, this study constructs an open-source database of 131 validated malicious drone incidents based on news reports, official releases, court and investigation records, academic publications, and security research materials, and conducts statistical analysis by attack type, adversary type, and target scenario. The results show that, within the open-source observable and validated sample, physically destructive forms account for 85.5% of incidents; meanwhile, significant associations are identified between target scenarios and attack type, adversary type, and casualty severity. In particular, airports and transportation-related critical infrastructure are highly vulnerable not only to direct damage, but also to low-altitude intrusion, reconnaissance, disruption, and cascading operational effects. These findings provide empirical support for threat identification, scenario-based protection, and response planning in transportation security.