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<p>The spike in Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden after 2008 pushed the international community toward a rare experiment in naval cooperation. Focusing on Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), this study traces how the task force was formed, what its mandate enabled, and how piracy evolved between 2009 and 2023. Drawing on UN resolutions, CMF/CTF-151 documents, and IMB incident records, it combines qualitative document analysis with a simple trend reading of reported attacks. The evidence suggests a steep and lasting drop in incidents after 2012, consistent with sustained patrols, coordinated transit protection, and tighter shipboard precautions. Still, the decline cannot be attributed to CTF-151 alone. Industry measures, parallel EU/NATO missions, seasonal constraints, and persistent onshore drivers—political fragility, illegal fishing grievances, and coastal poverty—remain part of the picture. The paper argues that deterrence at sea must be paired with long-term stabilization on land.</p>

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Multinational responses to Somali piracy: the emergence and contribution of combined task force 151 (2009–2023)

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月27日

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  • Barış Şahi̇ner

摘要

The spike in Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden after 2008 pushed the international community toward a rare experiment in naval cooperation. Focusing on Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), this study traces how the task force was formed, what its mandate enabled, and how piracy evolved between 2009 and 2023. Drawing on UN resolutions, CMF/CTF-151 documents, and IMB incident records, it combines qualitative document analysis with a simple trend reading of reported attacks. The evidence suggests a steep and lasting drop in incidents after 2012, consistent with sustained patrols, coordinated transit protection, and tighter shipboard precautions. Still, the decline cannot be attributed to CTF-151 alone. Industry measures, parallel EU/NATO missions, seasonal constraints, and persistent onshore drivers—political fragility, illegal fishing grievances, and coastal poverty—remain part of the picture. The paper argues that deterrence at sea must be paired with long-term stabilization on land.